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Why is there something rather than nothing? I don’t know. And if there were absolutely nothing—not 
even potential logical structures or time or … it’s difficult to see how things could get off the ground. 
But it’s simply not clear that that’s the right question. It may be that it requires fewer (weaker) 
assumptions to allow that there are possibilities. If that’s the case, we may at least consider the 
existence of such-and-such possibility.
Now, suppose we have the existence of the possibility p1, 2 + 3 = 5, which is to say, if there were 2 
things (physical, numerical, etc.) and 3 (other) things, then there would be 5 things. But this already 
gives us other information. For example, it rules out the existence of the possibility p2, 2 + 3 = 6. So p1 
rules out p2.
We want to consider the possibility ‘(a particular shade of the quale) red exists’. The problem here is 
that this simply does not rule out that what ‘red’ means within the possibility is not what we would call 
‘green’ (for example). The locution ‘red exists’ does not rule out that ‘red’ could refer to any particular 
quality whatsoever. Thus, ‘red’ cannot be part of the existence of the possibility, as the possibility does 
not mean what we want it to mean.  
Instead, we have the existence of the possibility p3 that
(1)  ██ exists
which is to say, if there were ██ then red would exist.
 (This is an example of what I have elsewhere called a qualation.)
Now, (1) rules out that the possibility in question could be talking about anything other than red qualia 
and (I would claim) it is the only way to do so. But notice that to merely specify the possibility of the 
existence of red qua redness, we had to give an actual red. Otherwise, the possibility does not know (so
to speak) what is meant by ‘red’. So in p1 and p2 we have it that the subjunctive ‘if there were …’ does 
not require the actual existence of anything, but in p3 we have it that the subjunctive ‘if there were …’ 
does require the actual existence of some particular thing.
What I have been struggling to argue is that ‘the possibility red’ must itself contain actual redness, 
since otherwise the possibility cannot specify what it is a possibility of. If this possibility wants (so to 
speak) to rule out that it is the possibility of the existence of greenness, then it must specify ‘red’ in the 
possibility in such a way that it can be differentiated from ‘green’. But a mere name for a color cannot 
do this. The only way to do this is to use the actual quale of redness. 
The conclusion is that the mere possibility of the existence of redness requires the actual existence of 
redness. Otherwise the possibility cannot specify which quale it is the possibility of.
This argument evidently applies to any possible quale whatsoever. On the one hand that sounds bad. 
But on the other hand, it could turn out that physical laws and physical things can be understood as 
particular kinds of qualia.
